While it represents a common form of gender-based violence, misogyny is an often-overlooked concept within academia and the queer community. Drawing on queer and feminist scholarship on gay male misogyny, this article presents a theoretical challenge to the myth that the oppressed cannot oppress, arguing that specific forms of gay male subjectivities can be proponents of misogyny in ways that are unrecognised because of their sexually marginalised status. The authors’ interest in the doing of misogyny, and its effects on specific (...) bodies and subjectivities, leads them to discuss the extent to which white gay male misogyny can function to reinforce a particular gender and racial hierarchy that continually confines queer femininities to the status of the abject other, for failing to exhibit their feminine credentials and for making gender trouble. The study also addresses how specific markers of femininity are depoliticised through the workings of this misogyny, exploring what femininity does when it is conceptualised outside a heteronormative framework. To address these ideas, the authors firstly propose a theoretical account of misogyny in order to understand its analytical status as a cultural mechanism within the psychic economy of patriarchy. Secondly, they use queer approaches to effeminacy and subject formation for making the case for gay male misogyny and its connections to femininity within white gay cultures, asking how misogyny might become an essential component of the performance of hegemonic masculinity. The article concludes with a discussion of the ways in which gay male misogyny reinforces white male dominance over women and queer femininities specifically, advocating for resistance to the reproduction of such patriarchal arrangements. (shrink)

This volume presents the concept of Ecoscape as spatial interrelations, or spatially patterned processes, that are constitutive of an environment_an ecosystem. Contributors investigate environmental issues concerning the human impact on geohistory, food distribution, genetically modified biota, waste management, scientific mapping, and the rethinking of human identity.

This paper defends the view that philosophical propositions are merely relatively true, i.e. true relative to a doxastic perspective defined at least in part by a non-inferential belief-acquiring method. Here is the strategy: first, the primary way that contemporary philosophers defend their views is through the use of rational intuition, and this method delivers non-inferential, basic beliefs which are then systematized and brought into reflective equilibrium. Second, Christian theologians use exactly the same methodology, only replacing intuition with revelation. Third, intuition (...) and revelation yield frequently inconsistent output beliefs. Fourth, there is no defensible reason to prefer the dictates of intuition to those of Christian revelation. Fifth, the resulting dilemma means that there are true philosophical propositions, but we can't know them (scepticism), or there are no philosophical propositions and the naturalists are right (nihilism), or relativism is true. I suggest that relativism is the most palatable of these alternatives. (shrink)

The historical development of scientific knowledge is examined in the context of research, and not, as tradition tells, in the context of justification. It is a story about experimental researches and theoretical investigations conducted in the years 1820-1902, which finally led to the discovery of electron, accompanied by methodological comments. Main results of the analysis are that knowledge is scientific if it has a systemic character, and experimental studies are scientific if they are systematic. „Systemic” means that studied objects or (...) processes are assumed (a) to obey to the same laws, (b) if we know nothing about that the change of experimental situation can influence the given theoretical property of an object or process, than this property, determined in other successful applications of an accepted theory (i.e. the set of laws), should be attributed to objects or processes in new applications of the same theory. „Systematic” means that the same objects or processes are examined experimentally in a number of different, but interrelated, situations (so many as time, money and available laboratory instruments allow). I also try to show that in the historical growth of scientific knowledge hypotheses, understood as „free creations of the imagination”, do not play almost any role. Almost all theoretical discoveries are products of inferences that can be logically reconstructed and whose premises are (1) known and accepted laws of nature, (2) what is known about the studied objects on the basis of approved applications of these laws, (3) new experimental results. The moral of this is that theoretical discoveries appear if and only if the system of scientific knowledge is mature enough: it is impossible to draw conclusions, if you lack the necessary premises. A scientist cannot, by letting her imagination to run wild, to be ahead of her time, and if she tries to do that, she usually goes beyond the boundaries of science. (shrink)

In the present paper, I offer a new argument to show that presentism about time is incompatible with time travel. Time travel requires leaving the present, which, under presentism, contains all of reality. Therefore to leave the present moment is to leave reality entirely; i.e. to go out of existence. Presentist “time travel” is therefore best seen as a form of suicide, not as a mode of transportation. Eternalists about time do not face the same difficulty, and time travel is (...) compossible with eternalism. (shrink)

Electronic waste is the fastest growing form of waste worldwide, associated with a range of environmental, health, and justice problems. Unfortunately, disposal and recycling are hindered by a tendency of consumers to resist recycling their e-waste. This backlog of un-discarded e-waste poses significant challenges for the future. This paper addresses the reasons why many people might continue to value their technological artifacts and therefore to hoard them, suggesting that many of these common explanations are deficient in some way. It argues (...) instead for a derivative kind of value, here labelled “system value”. Addressing the problem of hoarding by invoking the idea of system value, the authors conjecture, could offer some clarity about how to move forward with more successful e-waste management programs. (shrink)

There are two main ways to understand unconditional love. I argue that one is impossible (i.e., no one could love that way) and the other is probably irrational. This has important consequences in a variety of domains. Social policies have been derided on the grounds that they undermine unconditional love, and it has been called "possibly the most valuable aspect of the Christian tradition". The works of Robert Nozick, Elizabeth Anderson, and Richard Taylor on this topic are examined and criticized.

At least some of us, at least some of the time—when not in the grip of radical sceptical doubt—are inclined to believe that we know, for example, that if we infer a conclusion from two true premises, one a conditional whose consequent is that conclusion and the other the antecedent of that conditional, then our conclusion must be true, or that we know similar things about other simple patterns of inference. If we do indeed have knowledge of this sort, it (...) is what I mean by logical knowledge. Logical knowledge is, roughly speaking, knowledge about logic—such as knowledge that a certain principle of inference necessarily preserves truth, or that every proposition of a certain form must be true—and so is not the same thing as knowledge that is gained by using logic, i.e. inferential knowledge. That is not to say, of course, that logical knowledge can't be inferential. On the contrary, it is barely open to question that—if there is any logical knowledge at all—there is a lot of inferential logical knowledge. For example, if we know that the introduction and elimination principles for the conditional are truth-preserving, we can surely get to know, by inference, that the principle of hypothetical syllogism is so too, not to mention other, less obvious and more recondite, examples of putative logical knowledge. (shrink)

In this paper, we discuss some rather puzzling facts concerning the semantics of Warlpiri expressions of cardinality, i.e. the Warlpiri counterparts of English expressions like one,two, many, how many. The morphosyntactic evidence, discussed in section 1, suggests that the corresponding expressions in Warlpiri are nominal, just like the Warlpiri counterparts of prototypical nouns, eg. child. We also argue that Warlpiri has no articles or any other items of the syntactic category D(eterminer). In section 2, we describe three types of readings— (...) "definite", "indefinite" and "predicative"—which are generally found with Warlpiri nouns, including those which correspond to English common nouns and cardinality expressions. A partial analysis of these readings is sketched i n section 3. Since Warlpiri has no determiner system, we hypothesize that the source of (in)definiteness in this language is semantic. More specifically, we suggest that Warlpiri nominals are basically interpreted as individual terms or predicates of individuals and that their three readings arise as a consequence of the interaction of their basic meanings, which are specific to Warlpiri, with certain semantic operations, such as type shifting (Rooth and Partee 1982, Partee and Rooth 1983, Partee 1986, 1987), which universally can or must apply in the process of compositional semantic interpretation. (shrink)

The contribution to L2-acquisition which comes from UG is conceptually distinct from that which comes from L1 (or from L1 and L2 jointly), but it is difficult to tease the two apart. The workings of deep, core principles (e.g., locality and subjacency) are so massively evident in L1 and L2 as to be of questionable use in the search for the contribution which is purely of UG.

On elective students may not always be clear about safeguarding themselves and others. It is important that placements are safe, and ethically grounded. A concern for medical schools is equipping their students for exposure to and response to uncomfortable and/or unfamiliar requests in locations away from home, where their comfort and safety, or that of the patient, may be compromised. This can require legal, ethical, and/or moral reasoning on the part of the student. The goal of this article is to (...) establish what students actually encounter on elective, to inform better preparing students for safe and ethical medical placements. We discuss the implications of our findings, which are arguably applicable to other areas of graduate training, e.g. first medical roles post-qualification. An anonymised survey exploring clinical and ethical dilemmas on elective was issued across 3 years of returning final year elective medical students. Questions included the prevalence and type of potentially unsafe scenarios encountered, barriers to saying ‘no’ in unsafe situations, perceived differences between resource poor and developed world settings and the degree to which students refused or consented to participation in events outside of the ‘norms’ of their own training experience. Three hundred seventy-nine students participated. 45% were asked to do something “not permissible” at home. 27% were asked to do something they felt “uncomfortable” with, often an invasive clinical task. Half asked to do something not usually permissible were “comfortable”. 48% felt it more acceptable to bypass guidelines in developing settings. 27% refused an offer outside their experience. Of interest are reasons for “going along with” uncomfortable invitations, e.g. “emergency”, self-belief in ‘capability’ and being ‘more qualified’ than host-personnel. This “best pair of hands available” merits scrutiny. Adverse scenarios were not exclusive to developing settings. We discuss preparing students for decision-making in new contexts, and address whether ‘home’ processes are too inflexible to prepare students for ‘real’ medical life? Ethical decision-making and communicating reluctance should be included in elective preparation. (shrink)

Ergative languages make up a substantial percentage of the world’s languages. They have a case system which distinguishes the subject of a transitive verb from that of an intransitive, grouping the latter with the object — that is, the object of a transitive verb and the subject of an intransitive verb are in the same case, which we refer to as the nominative. However, ergative languages differ from one another in important ways. In Greenlandic Eskimo the nominative, whether it is (...) a subject or an object, is syntactically prominent in the clause, much like a subject in English; but in Warlpiri, the nominative is not prominent, more like an object. The variable prominence of the nominative manifests itself as well in the semantics, e.g., default scope of indefinite and quantified nominals. Using data from Greenlandic Eskimo and Warlpiri, and from Hindi, which represents a split ergative system, this paper develops a general theory of case which explains the observed differences amongst ergative languages. In addition, the theory is designed to account for the accusative language type, represented by English. (shrink)

This article discusses the ecological and cultural criteria underlying the management practices for protected areas in France. It examines the evolution of French conservation from its roots in the 19th century, when it focused on the protection of scenic landscapes, to current times when the focus is on the protection of biodiversity. However, biodiversity is often socially defined and may not represent an ecologically sound objective for conservation. In particular, we question the current approach to protecting a specific type of (...) biodiversity that is at the basis of traditional landscape but does not value systems that are left to develop naturally (i.e., without significant human intervention). We present several examples of current attempts in France and Europe to managing traditional ecosystems and then discuss the values that exist in systems that develop naturally. We feel the latter systems often have much to offer in terms of biodiversity as well as providing important sites for the study of dynamic ecological communities in an ever-changing world. (shrink)

Unsuccessful Adaptations Another Approach: Deliberation Within Dangers of Internal Deliberation Informing the Democratic Imagination From Democratic Deliberation to Democratic Legitimacy Notes.

A discussion of the notion of infinity as it appears in the prototype of the great Summae of the thirteenth century, the Summa Fratris Alexandri, traditionally ascribed to Alexander of Hales but now known to be a compilation by the monks at the Paris house of the Franciscans to which Alexander belonged. This Summa reveals the initial effects of the Aristotelian analysis upon the then dominant Neo-Platonic, Augustinian and Anselmian Illuminationisms, and its relation to the philosophical notion of an infinite (...) God. As Wass stresses, the notion of infinity systematically expounded in this Summa provided the conceptual framework for most of the subsequent medieval speculation on the subject.—E. A. R. (shrink)

We present historical and epistemological notes on the relationships between Chemistry–Physics as dating back to two scientific revolutions: Lavoisier’s Traité Élémentaire de Chimie (1789) and by Sadi Carnot’s Réflexions sur la Puissance Motrice du Feu (1824). Their scientific paradigms and mathematical interpretations of chemical and physical phenomena did not made use of infinitesimal analysis as, i.e., exposed within mechanics and, generally speaking, they were totally different from notable Newtonian paradigm survived until to 19th century. An anomaly was, and two revolutions (...) were produced. (shrink)

Edited by Ivette Fred-Rivera and Jessica Leech. What is the relationship between ontology and modality: between what there is, and what there could be, must be, or might have been? Throughout a distinguished career, Bob Hale’s work has addressed this question on a number of fronts, through the development of a Fregean approach to ontology, an essentialist theory of modality, and in his work on neo-logicism in the philosophy of mathematics. This collection of new essays engages with these themes (...) in Hale’s work in order to make further progress in our understanding of ontology, modality, and the relations between them. Some essays directly address questions in modal metaphysics, drawing on ontological concerns. Others raise questions in modal epistemology and its links to matters of ontology, such as the challenge to give an epistemology of essence. There are also several essays engaging with questions of what might be called ‘modal ontology’: the study of whether and what things exist necessarily or contingently. Such issues can be raised and addressed directly, but they also have an important bearing on the kinds of semantic commitments engendered in logic and mathematics, e.g., to the existence of sets, or numbers, or properties, and so on. It is thus explored in some chapters to what extent one’s ontology—and indeed, one’s ontology of necessary beings—interacts with other plausible assumptions and commitments. (shrink)

La rinascita negli ultimi decenni di un nutrito dibattito intorno alla nozione di analiticità dopo le critiche a suo tempo mosse da Quine alla batteria di nozioni utilizzate da Rudolf Carnap (ad esempio, postulati di significato, regole semantiche, definizioni implicite, convenzioni e stipulazioni esplicite) prende le mosse da una riflessione critica sulle argomentazioni di Quine e tenta, da un lato, di approfondire meglio il legame fra analiticità e conoscenza a priori, e, dall’altro, di capire meglio il ruolo che la definizione (...) può svolgere nella costituzione del significato e nella formulazione di verità concettuali. Questa nuova concezione è detta “epistemica” ed ha fra i suoi più autorevoli fautori Crispin Wright, Bob Hale e Paul Boghossian. Boghossian, al pari di molti filosofi critici della nuova concezione epistemica, come Timothy Williamson, conviene però con Quine nel sostenere che gli enunciati analitici hanno portata fattuale e vertono anch’essi sul mondo, oltre che sul linguaggio. Anche per questa ragione essi possono rendere possibile una genuina estensione delle nostre conoscenze. Tuttavia una seconda linea di obiezioni facenti capo dapprima a Paul Horwich, e in seguito agli stessi Wright e Hale, mette in evidenza rispettivamente due difficoltà corrispondenti alle questioni dell’arroganza e dell’accettazione. In questa discussione una parte importante è svolta dalla ripresa e della discussione del condizionale di Carnap, impiegato per rendere conto del ruolo che i termini teorici svolgono nel quadro dell’intera teoria cui appartengono, senza con ciò sposare le conseguenze dell’olismo quineano. La tesi centrale che questo lavoro cerca di rendere plausibile è che una lettura attenta degli ultimi scritti di Carnap mostri come il carattere aperto che egli attribuisce ai termini teorici in ragione, sia dello loro intrinseca indeterminatezza, sia delle revisioni imposte dalle scoperte scientifiche, è perfettamente compatibile con la fattorizzazione del contenuto di una teoria scientifica data in una parte linguistica, il condizionale di Carnap, riguardante la costituzione del significato di un certo termine teorico, e nella sua controparte empirica, che consente di registrare l’impatto dell’esperienza sulla teoria in questione. Se praticabile, questa concezione può a buon diritto entrare nel novero delle teorie epistemiche dell’analiticità, senza accampare alcuna pretesa di far rivivere i fasti della conoscenza a priori classica. (shrink)

Our concern is in explaining how and why models give us useful knowledge. We argue that if we are to understand how models function in the actual scientific practice the representational approach to models proves either misleading or too minimal. We propose turning from the representational approach to the artefactual, which implies also a new unit of analysis: the activity of modelling. Modelling, we suggest, could be approached as a specific practice in which concrete artefacts, i.e., models, are constructed with (...) the help of specific representational means and used in various ways, for example, for the purposes of scientific reasoning, theory construction and design of experiments and other artefacts. Furthermore, in this activity of modelling the model construction is intertwined with the construction of new phenomena, theoretical principles and new scientific concepts. We will illustrate these claims by studying the construction of the ideal heat engine by Sadi Carnot. (shrink)

This paper explores the scientific sources behind Kant’s early dynamic theory of matter in 1755, with a focus on two main Kant’s writings: Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens and On Fire. The year 1755 has often been portrayed by Kantian scholars as a turning point in the intellectual career of the young Kant, with his much debated conversion to Newton. Via a careful analysis of some salient themes in the two aforementioned works, and a reconstruction of the (...) scientific sources behind them, this paper shows Kant’s debt to an often overlooked scientific tradition, i.e. speculative Newtonian experimentalism. The paper argues that more than the Principia, it was the speculative experimentalism that goes from Newton’s Opticks to Herman Boerhaave’s Elementa chemiae via Stephen Hales’ Vegetable Staticks that played a central role in the elaboration of Kant’s early dynamic theory of matter in 1755. (shrink)

Much of The Reason’s Proper Study is devoted to defending the claim that simply by stipulating an abstraction principle for the “number-of” functor, we can simultaneously fix a meaning for this functor and acquire epistemic entitlement to the stipulated principle. In this paper, I argue that the semantic and epistemological principles Hale and Wright offer in defense of this claim may be too strong for their purposes. For if these principles are correct, it is hard to see why they (...) do not justify platonist strategies that are not in any way “neo-Fregean,” e.g. strategies that treat “the number of Fs” as a Russellian definite description rather than a singular term, or employ axioms that do not have the form of abstraction principles. (shrink)

Mathematical fictionalism (or as I'll call it, fictionalism) is best thought of as a reaction to mathematical platonism. Platonism is the view that (a) there exist abstract mathematical objects (i.e., nonspatiotemporal mathematical objects), and (b) our mathematical sentences and theories provide true descriptions of such objects. So, for instance, on the platonist view, the sentence ‘3 is prime’ provides a straightforward description of a certain object—namely, the number 3—in much the same way that the sentence ‘Mars is red’ provides a (...) description of Mars. But whereas Mars is a physical object, the number 3 is (according to platonism) an abstract object. And abstract objects, platonists tell us, are wholly nonphysical, nonmental, nonspatial, nontemporal, and noncausal. Thus, on this view, the number 3 exists independently of us and our thinking, but it does not exist in space or time, it is not a physical or mental object, and it does not enter into causal relations with other objects. This view has been endorsed by Plato, Frege (1884, 1893-1903, 1919), Gödel (1964), and in some of their writings, Russell (1912) and Quine (1948, 1951), not to mention numerous more recent philosophers of mathematics, e.g., Putnam (1971), Parsons (1971), Steiner (1975), Resnik (1997), Shapiro (1997), Hale (1987), Wright (1983), Katz (1998), Zalta (1988), and Colyvan (2001). (shrink)

A re-visitation of Joule’s experiment motivates a critical analysis of thermodynamic notions: heat, total energy, first principle, organization of a scientific theory, its relationships with logic and mathematics. A rational re-construction of thermodynamics is suggested according to the model of a problem-based organization, that Sadi Carnot applied to his formulation. The new formulation accomplishes the long time theoretical process started by Joule’s experiment within physicists community's collective mind, i.e. the process of exiting out Baconian science for suggesting a first theory (...) out Newton’s paradigm, and eventually for introducing a pluralism of incompatible physical theories. (shrink)

I characterize Bishop's constructive mathematics as an alternative to classical mathematics, which makes use of the actual infinity. From the history an accurate investigation of past physical theories I obtianed some ones - mainly Lazare Carnot's mechanics and Sadi Carnot's thermodynamics - which are alternative to the dominant theories - e.g. Newtopn's mechanics. The way to link together mathematics to theoretical physics is generalized and some general considerations, in particualr on the geoemtry in theoretical physics, are obtained.that.

Introduction: -/- It is likely that Boethius (480-524ce) inaugurates, in Latin Christian theology, the consideration of personhood as such. In the Treatise Against Eutyches and Nestorius Boethius gives a well-known definition of personhood according to genus and difference(s): a person is an individual substance of a rational nature. Personhood is predicated only of individual rational substances. This chapter situates Boethius in relation to significant Christian theologians before and after him, and the way in which his definition of personhood is a (...) particular answer to the question, “Jesus has two natures, a divine nature and a human nature, but is one what?” Among Greek (and Syriac) speaking theologians, the typical answer is that Jesus is one ‘hypostasis’. Among Latin speaking theologians, the typical answer is that Jesus is one ‘persona’. It is Boethius’s definition of ‘persona’ that inaugurates personhood as such in Latin speaking theology. Although the Greek and Syriac theologians that I survey come close to a concept of personhood as a distinct category, they do not have such a concept and did not need it for their theological purposes. I show that Rusticus the Deacon is an early witness to this Latin theological invention, and also show that for later Latin theologians, the rationality condition for personhood does very little metaphysical work for their Trinitarian theology or Christology. -/- Further, this chapter surveys Patristic and Medieval Christian theologians’ answers to the question, “God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit are one God, but each is one what?” The same replies as above are typically given by Christian theologians. These two theological questions frame the discussion about personhood (and ‘hypostasis’) and put a boundary around what a satisfying account of personhood (and ‘hypostasis’) would be. -/- In contemporary philosophy, there is a lot of attention paid to the rationality condition for personhood. But if we look at the text in which Boethius defines a person, we do not find any precise criteria for it. In other texts, he says that a rational being is one compatible with (capable of) thought and free choice of the will. What we find is that detailed discussion of personhood shows up in theological questions about the Trinity and Incarnation, but not in e.g., applied ethics. The intrusion of personhood into contemporary applied ethics with a focus on detailed and disputed criteria for rationality as a condition for personhood seems to be a modern development. From a Patristic and Medieval Christian theology point of view, trying to find just the right detailed criteria for rationality in order to define personhood is a wild goose chase. This chapter makes clear another contribution that Christian theology had for personhood. Given the theological issues at play in developing a notion of personhood, Christian theologians came to posit that e.g., an individual human is a person contingently (i.e. not essentially), but God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit are each a person essentially. The contingency for created persons is not based on whether e.g., an individual human has conscious acts (as might be the case for John Locke) but on the possibility of a divine person’s assuming e.g., an individual human nature. -/- This sampling of Christian intellectual history spans over one thousand years. I make no claim of being exhaustive. The chapter consists of six sections, where each section covers significant historical conversation partners who together represent the sorts of things that Patristic and Medieval Christian theologians where concerned with in theorizing about ‘persona’ or ‘hypostasis’. -/- 1. Origen of Alexandria and the Cappadocians: Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nyssa 2. Miaphysites: Severus of Antioch, John Philoponus, and Peter of Callinicum 3. Boethius and Rusticus the Deacon: Rationality, Subsistence, and the Invention of Personhood 4. Neo-Chalcedonians (II): Leontius of Byzantium 5. Scholastic Neo-Chalcedonians (I): Gilbert of Poitiers, Richard of St. Victor, William of Auxerre, Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, and William of Ware 6. Scholastic Neo-Chalcedonians (II): Henry of Ghent, John Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham . (shrink)

Çocuk evliliği, tarih boyunca farklı toplumlarda bilinen ve uygulanan sosyal bir olgu olsa da son zamanlarda, modern duyarlılıkları giderek daha fazla rahatsız eden bir hal almıştır. Son iki asır öncesine kadar, Avrupa hukuki düşüncesinde çocuklar yargı önünde farklı bir muamele görmelerine imkan veren istisnai bir statüye sahip değildi. Diğer taraftan, İslam hukukunun çocuklara, özel bir hukuki statü kazandırma konusunda bazı öncü adımlar attığını söyleyebiliriz. Nitekim, en eski İslam hukuku kitaplarının bile, insanın fiziksel ve zihinsel gelişim aşamalarına ve her bir aşamada (...) ortaya çıkan hukuki hükümlere dair son derece teknik ayrıntılarla dolu olduğunu görebiliriz. Ancak çocuk hakları konusundaki bu erken farkındalığa rağmen, çocuk evliliği olgusu hem İslam toplumlarında hem de İslam hukukunda kendini gösterebilmiştir. Çünkü, İslam çocuk hukuku, ilk ortaya çıktığı dönemin kültürel şartlarından ciddi şekilde etkilenmiştir. Üstelik bu kültürel şartlar, İslam dünyası boyunca İslam çocuk hukukunun temel zemini olma işlevini sürdüre gelmiştir. Bu çalışma, alimlerin çocuk evliliğini delillendirmek üzere yapageldikleri bazı aşırı yorumları ortaya koymaya ve konuyla ilgili âyetleri metinsel bağlamıyla daha uyumlu bir şekilde okumaya çalışmaktadır.Özet: Her bağlam için geçerli olabilecek, standart bir çocuk tanımı yapmak göründüğünden daha güçtür. Bu nedenle çocuk araştırmaları sahasında çalışan akademisyenlerin, muhtelif sosyal disiplinler tarafından yapılacak herhangi bir çocuk tarifi konusunda memnuniyetsizlik içinde olması doğaldır. Diğer yandan, İslam hukukunda baştan beri ayrıntılı bir çocuk hukuku teorisi mevcuttur. İslam hukuk düşüncesinde, insanlar doğum ile yetişkinlik arasındaki gelişim döneminde üç aşamadan geçerler: Çocukluk (küçüklük), buluğ ve rüşt. Bütün fıkıh mezhepleri, insanın doğumu ile ergenliği arasındaki dönemde küçük çocuk sayılacağı kanaatindedirler. Bu çocukların mallarının en iyi şekilde idare edilebilmesi için yasal temsilcileri bulunmak zorundadır. Fakîhler çocuğun velisinin, özellikle de baba veya baba tarafından dedenin, velâyeti altındaki küçük çocuklar üzerinde mücbir bir yetkisi olduğu (velâyet-i mücbire) konusunda geniş bir fikir birliğine sahiptirler. Buna göre veliler, velâyetleri altında bulunan çocukları uygun gördükleri kişilerle evlendirme yetkisine de sahiptirler. Fakat zaman zaman beşik kertmesi olarak da anılan bu uygulama bir ön sözleşmeden ibarettir. Yani bu sözleşme doğrudan doğruya fiziksel boyutları da olan müşterek bir evlilik hayatını meşru kılmamaktadır. Çünkü cinsel hayatın ancak buluğdan sonra gerçekleşmesi ön görülmektedir. Modernite öncesi İslam tarihi boyunca, İbn Şubrume (ö. 144/761), Ebû Bekr el-Esamm (ö. 200/816) ve Osman el-Bettî (ö. 143/760) gibi bir kaç fakih dışında küçük çocukların evlenmesine kategorik olarak karşı çıkan kimselere pek rast gelinmemektedir.Hanefi mezhebinde, herhangi bir zihinsel özrü olmaksızın buluğa eren erkek ve kız çocuklar evlilik konusunda mücbir velâyetin kapsamı dışına çıkarlar. Bu, evlilik sözleşmelerini bizzat gerçekleştirebilecekleri anlamına gelmektedir. Fakat veli, uygunsuz bulduğu evliliğe karşı dava açarak bunu yargı yoluyla geçersiz kılma yoluna gidebilir. Diğer üç Sunnî mezhep ise erkek ve kız çocuklar arasında bir ayrım yapar: Buluğa eren erkek kendi evlilik akdini yapabilme hakkını elde ederken aynı durumdaki kız çocuklar velâyet altında kalmaya devam ederler. Şâfiʿî mezhebine göre, velâyeti gerekli kılan illet (bekaret) hâlâ geçerliliğini korumaktadır. Dolayısıyla veli, kızları evlendirme konusundaki icbâri yetkisini elinde tutmaya devam etmektedir. Bu durumda kızın rızasının alınması, akdin geçerliliği için şart olmaktan ziyade sadece nezaket gereğidir. Rüşte ulaşmak veya fizyolojik olgunlaşma sürecini tamamlamak ise İslam hukukunda evlilik için şart görülmemiştir.Modern zamanlara kadar geleneksel İslam hukukunun erken evlilik lehinde gösterdiği bu yaklaşımda herhangi bir değişiklik olmamıştır. 1917 yılında çıkan Hukuk-ı Aile Kararnamesi daha önce benzeri görülmemiş bir dizi düzenleme getirmiştir: İlk olarak, evlilik yaşı erkek için on sekiz kız için ise on yedi olarak belirlenmiştir. On sekiz yaşın altındaki erkeklerin hakimden evlenme izni alması; on yedi yaşından küçük kızların ise hem veli onayı hem de hakim iznine sahip olması zorunlu hale getirilmiştir. On iki yaşın altındaki erkekler ile dokuz yaşından küçük kızların ise asla evlendirilemeyeceği kararlaştırılmıştır.Mantıkî bağlam ve sentaktik yapı elverişli olmamasına rağmen fakihler çocuk evliliğini desteklemek üzere bazı Kur’ân âyetlerine (Nisâ 4/3-6, Nisâ 4/127, Talâk 65/4) referansta bulunmuşlardır. Makale içeriğinde detaylı şekilde açıklandığı üzere zorlama yorumlamalarda bulunmuşlardır. Bu makale, söz konusu âyetlere daha tutarlı bir yorum getirmeye çalışmaktadır. Aynı şekilde, Kur’an’ın çocuk evliliğini kolaylaştırıcı bir tavır içerisinde olmadığını, çocukların evlendirilebilmesi yönündeki yaklaşımların tarihsel ve kültürel şartlara bağlı olarak yapılan bazı zorlama yorumlara dayandığını ileri sürmektedir.Hz. ʿÂişe’nin Hz. Peygamber ile oldukça erken bir yaşta evlendiğine dair nakledilen rivâyet de konuyla ilgili olarak ileri sürülen başka bir argümandır. Bu rivâyetin sahih olduğuna inanılmaktadır. Buna rağmen ilginç bir şekilde bu rivâyet çok az fakih tarafından kullanılmıştır. Bunun sebebi, fakîhlerin Hz. Peygamberin mahremiyetinden bahsetmek istememeleri olabilir. Rivâyetin hücciyeti konusuna kuşkuya kapılmış olmaları da mümkündür. Söz konusu rivâyete daha yakından bakıldığında, ifadedeki menfi üslup hemen dikkat çekmektedir. Çünkü rivâyette Hz. ʿÂişe, Hz. Peygamberle evlendiği günü anlatırken sürekli olarak fizyolojik ve psikolojik açıdan olumsuz koşullardan bahsetmektedir. Nitekim Hz. ʿÂişe birden bire oynamakta olduğu salıncaktan alınmakta ve kendisinin de bilmediği bir yere doğru götürülmektedir. Rivâyet, sadece çocuk evliliğinin cevazını ortaya koymakla yetinmemekte, sanki aynı zamanda çocukların uygunsuz koşullardaki evlilik taleplerine bile itaatkar olmaları gerektiğini salık vermektedir. İçerik yanında teknik olarak bakıldığında bu rivâyet, haber-i vâhiddir. Çünkü rivâyet, sadece Hz. ʿÂişe tarafından bilinebilecek detayları içermektedir. Tarihî açıdan bir öneme sahip olmasına rağmen dinî hükümlere kanıt olma niteliğinden yoksundur. Çünkü bu rivâyette, râvi konuyla ilgili Hz. Peygamber’e ait resmi bir açıklamayı nakletmemekte; sadece kendi zaviyesinden maruz kaldığı bir durumdan bahsetmektedir. (shrink)

Certain advocates of the so-called “neo-logicist” movement in the philosophy of mathematics identify themselves as “neo-Fregeans” (e.g., Hale and Wright), presenting an updated and revised version of Frege’s form of logicism. Russell’s form of logicism is scarcely discussed in this literature and, when it is, often dismissed as not really logicism at all (in light of its assumption of axioms of infinity, reducibility and so on). In this paper I have three aims: firstly, to identify more clearly the primary (...) meta-ontological and methodological differences between Russell’s logicism and the more recent forms; secondly, to argue that Russell’s form of logicism offers more elegant and satisfactory solutions to a variety of problems that continue to plague the neo-logicist movement (the bad company objection, the embarrassment of richness objection, worries about a bloated ontology, etc.); thirdly, to argue that neo-Russellian forms of logicism remain viable positions for current philosophers of mathematics. (shrink)

This article concerns the ongoing neo-logicist program in the philosophy of mathematics. The enterprise began life, in something close to its present form, with Crispin Wright’s seminal [1983]. It was bolstered when Bob Hale [1987] joined the fray on Wright’s behalf and it continues through many extensions, objections, and replies to objections . The overall plan is to develop branches of established mathematics using abstraction principles in the form: Formula where a and b are variables of a given type (...) , Σ is a higher-order operator denoting a function from items of the given type to objects in the range of the first-order variables, and E is an equivalence relation over items of the given type. In what follows, I will sometimes omit the initial quantifiers.Frege [1884, 1893] himself employed three abstraction principles. One of them, used for illustration, comes from geometry: "The direction of l1 is identical to the direction of l2 if and only if l1 is parallel to l2."Call this the direction principle. The second was dubbed N= in [Wright, 1983] and is now called Hume’s principle: Formula where F≈G is an abbreviation of the second-order statement that there is a one-to-one relation mapping the F’s onto the G’s. In words, states that the number of F is identical to the number of G if and only if F is equinumerous with G. Unlike the direction-principle, the relevant variables, F, G here are second-order. Georg Cantor …. (shrink)

The general principle of epistemic closure stipulates that epistemic properties are transmissible through logical means. According to this principle, an epistemic operator, say ε, should satisfy any valid scheme of inference, such as: if ε(p entails q), then ε(p) entails ε(q). The principle of epistemic closure under known entailment (ECKE), a particular instance of epistemic closure, has received a good deal of attention since the last thirty years or so. ECKE states that: if one knows that p entails q, and (...) she knows that p, then she knows that q. It is widely accepted that ECKE constitutes an important piece of the skeptical argument, but the acceptance of an unrestricted version of ECKE is still a matter of debate. On the side of the defenders of ECKE, one finds Stine (1976), Brueckner (1985), Vogel (1990), and Feldman (1995). Others proposed a refutation or a limitation of the principle, like Dretske (1970), Nozick (1981), Hales (1995), Williams (1996), and Sosa (1999). As it turns out, the relevant alternatives view (RAV) elaborated by Dretske, which restricts the scope of ECKE, has been discussed extensively and acknowledged as one of the most important contributions. There is nonetheless a major unsolved difficulty pertaining to Dretske-RAV: the notion of relevant alternatives is defined in such a way that it is bounded by counterfactual possibilities. This ontological import leaves open the door to the skeptic. Some have tried to give more precision to this notion, like Stine (1976), who appealed to a Gricean approach to define relevant alternatives in conversational contexts. My proposal is in accordance with the gist of Dretske’s strategy, i.e. to restrict the validity of ECKE, and I claim that in order to escape the difficulties inherent to RAV one has to introduce a more robust notion, the notion of epistemic context. Epistemic contexts are a subclass of propositional contexts. In that perspective, the closure property is expressed in terms of a property of a relation between epistemic contexts. ECKE holds when and only when either the epistemic context of the premisses is the same as the epistemic context of the conclusion, or the epistemic context change between the premisses and the conclusion is permissible. Permissibility of epistemic context change is a function of consistency. By means of this epistemic context approach, I will show that: (1) epistemic contexts are defined by basic propositions (unchallenged justified beliefs), (2) ECKE holds only under very specific constraints, and (3) the skeptical argument involves a non-permissible change of epistemic context and, by the same token, cannot rely upon ECKE. (shrink)

Quine (1960, "Word and object". Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, ch. 2) claims that there are a variety of equally good schemes for translating or interpreting ordinary talk. 'Rabbit' might be taken to divide its reference over rabbits, over temporal slices of rabbits, or undetached parts of rabbits, without significantly affecting which sentences get classified as true and which as false. This is the basis of his famous 'argument from below' to the conclusion that there can be no fact of the (...) matter as to how reference is to be divided. Putative counterexamples to Quine's claim have been put forward in the past (see especially Evans (1975, "Journal of Philosophy", LXXII(13), 343-362. Reprinted in McDowell (Ed.), "Gareth Evans: Collected papers." Oxford: Clarendon Press.), Fodor (1993, "The elm and the expert: Mentalese and its semantics." Cambridge, MA: Bradford)), and various patches have been suggested (e. g. Wright (1997, The indeterminacy of translation. In C. Wright & B. Hale (Eds.), "A companion to the philosophy of language" (pp. 397-426). Oxford: Blackwell)). One lacuna in this literature is that one does not find any detailed presentation of what exactly these interpretations are supposed to be. Drawing on contemporary literature on persistence, the present paper sets out detailed semantic treatments for fragments of English, whereby predicates such as 'rabbit' divide their reference over four-dimensional continuants (Quine's rabbits), instantaneous temporal slices of those continuants (Quine's rabbitslices) and the simple elements which compose those slices (undetached rabbit parts) respectively. Once we have the systematic interpretations on the table, we can get to work evaluating them. (shrink)